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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
MICHAEL ROWE RUSSO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Nature of the Case 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. 41395 
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2009-29933 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON 
REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Michael Russo stands convicted of rape and two related felonies, and is currently 
serving a fixed life sentence. On appeal, Mr. Russo has asserted two claims of error. 
First, he has argued that the district court erred in failing to suppress a cell phone video 
discovered through a search of a cell phone found on his person. Second, he has 
contended that the district court erred in allowing the State to present irrelevant, highly 
prejudicial evidence concerning his deviant sexual interests. 
Mr. Russo's appeal was originally assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, which 
affirmed his convictions. See generally State v. Russo, 2013 Opinion No. 15 (Mar. 4, 
2013) (hereinafter Opinion). With regard to the Fourth Amendment "search" issue, the 
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Court of Appeals held that, even though officers had a warrant particularly describing 
the places to be searched as Mr. Russo's residence and his motorcycle, the police were 
nonetheless free to search-pursuant to the warrant-Mr. Russo's person and a phone 
found on his person, where Mr. Russo was detained outside the residence (and not on 
his motorcycle). (See Opinion, pp.3-6.) With regard to the issue concerning admission 
of the pornography evidence, the Court of Appeals found no error under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 404. (See Opinion, pp.7-10.) 
Mr. Russo sought, and the Idaho Supreme Court granted, review. In his 
Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, Mr. Russo pointed out the flaws in 
the Court of Appeals' reasoning, as well as reiterated the arguments he had made 
previously. In response, the State addresses only the Fourth Amendment issue. (It 
rests on its prior brief as to the Rule 404 issue.) With regard to the Fourth Amendment 
issue, the State argues narrowly that the search of Mr. Russo's person was within the 
scope of the warrant authorizing the search of his home because, although it is 
undisputed that Mr. Russo was outside his home, Mr. Russo has not proved he was 
outside the curtilage. (The State incorporates by reference its other arguments 
concerning the Fourth Amendment issue.) 
The present reply brief is necessary to address to the sole argument briefed by 
the State on review. In particular, Mr. Russo wishes to point out the myriad flaws in the 
State's chain of reasoning which lead it to the conclusion that a search warrant 
authorizing the search of a single apartment in a multi-unit structure allows officers to 
search the person (and the effects located on the person) of someone found in a public 
area outside the apartment in question. 
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously set forth in 
detail in the original Appellant's Brief as well as the Appellant's Brief in Support of 
Petition for Review. Accordingly, they should not require any further explication herein. 
However, because the State has provided only a limited statement of the facts on 
review, and has chosen to incorporate by reference "its statement of the facts and 
course of the proceedings as set forth in its brief on appeal," which contained a number 
of misleading statements, Mr. Russo refers this Court to the factual clarifications 
provided in his original reply brief. (See App. Reply Br., pp.1-3.) 
In addition, in its latest brief, the State has proffered an additional factual 
assertion that requires clarification. The State cites the district court's observation that 
the affidavit fried in support of the amended search included an allegation that, at 6:00 
a.m., Mr. Russo knocked on his neighbor's door to demand that she remove her clothes 
from the apartment building's laundry machines so that he could do some laundry.1 
(See Respondent's Brief, p.3.) While this assertion is consistent with the district court's 
summary of the evidence (see 1/27/10 Tr., p.72, Ls.13-22), as well as the affidavit from 
which it was derived (see R., p.153), the State neglects to mention that it does not 
appear to be accurate. In fact, Detective Cain's police report indicates that when she 
spoke to Mr. Russo's neighbors, they reported that Mr. Russo did not speak with them 
about the laundry until around 11 :00 a.m., at which time he merely informed one of 
them that her clothes were on top of the dryer because he "didn't want anyone to steal 
them." (See R., pp.142-43 (Det. Cain's report indicating that one female neighbor, who 
had returned from work around 10:30 a.m., reported speaking to Mr. Russo, and 
1 This was an allegation highlighted by the Court of Appeals as well. (See Opinion, p.2.) 
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directing him to the other female neighbor, around 11 :00 a.m., and indicating further that 
the second female neighbor reported that Mr. Russo knocked on her door to tell "her her 
clothes were on the dryer and that he didn't want anyone to steal them").) Notably, this 
is timeline completely consistent with Detective Cain's assertion that around 11 :00 a.m., 
while staking out Mr. Russo's residence, she saw Mr. Russo exit his apartment and 
disappear for a number of minutes behind his building (in an area later determined to be 
where the laundry room was located). (R., p.142l 
2 Although not before the district court at the suppression hearing, the trial testimony of 
Corporal Brian Lueddeke, with the Meridian Police Department, corroborated Detective 
Cain's report. Corporal Lueddeke was the first officer dispatched to Mr. Russo's 
residence on the morning of the J.W.'s rape. (See 8/30/10 Tr., p.294, L.6 - p.297, L.8.) 
He testified that he was dispatched before 6:00 a.m. and watched the residence for an 
hour until he was relieved, and that during that time he never saw Mr. Russo enter or 
exit the residence. (Tr., p.294, L.14 - p.297, L.8.) Since the front door was the only 
way in or out of Mr. Russo's residence (R., p.142), had Mr. Russo been banging on his 
neighbor's door at 6:00 a.m. demanding that she remove her clothes from the 
apartment building's laundry facilities, Corporal Lueddeke most likely would have seen 
him. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in failing to suppress the video discovered by police in an 
unconstitutional search of Mr. Russo's cell phone? 
2. Did the district court err in admitting irrelevant, highly prejudicial evidence 
concerning Mr. Russo's deviant sexual interests?3 
3 Because the State has not addressed this issue in its Respondent's Brief on Review, 
no reply is necessary herein. Rather, just as the State relies upon, and incorporates, its 
prior arguments on this issue, so too does Mr. Russo. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Failing To Suppress The Video Discovered In An 
Unconstitutional Search Of Mr. Russo's Cell Phone 
In arguing that Mr. Russo's suppression motion was properly denied by the 
district court, the State's reply brief on review offers only a single argument-that the 
original search warrant in this case authorized searches of not just the items specifically 
described therein (Mr. Russo's residence and motorcycle), but also of the public areas 
surrounding Mr. Russo's residence and anything or anyone found thereon. (See Resp. 
Br. on Rev., pp.6, 7 -10l In attempting to lead this Court to such a conclusion, the 
State starts by painting a misleading picture of the facts. In particular, the State largely 
ignores the fact that the search warrant in this case specifically described the "premises 
and/or motor vehicle" to be searched as Mr. Russo's "residence" and his "motorcycle"; 
the State focuses almost exclusively upon the warrant's use of the term "premises," as if 
it had authorized a search of the "premises" at Mr. Russo's home without defining what 
the term "premises" meant. Next, focusing on the term "premises," as if it had been 
used in isolation, the State suggests that the term "premises" is vague and ambiguous 
and, therefore, subject to interpretation. Having contrived this supposed ambiguity, the 
State then argues that, in interpreting the term "premises," this Court should read that 
term as broadly as possible; it then proposes a bright-line rule that the term "premises" 
is necessary coextensive with the legal term of art, "curtilage." Next, the State 
concludes that because the search in question occurred somewhat near to Mr. Russo's 
4 Although the State has not elaborated on them, the State continues to stand by the 
additional (alternative) arguments proffered in its original Respondent's Brief. (See 
Resp. Br. on Rev., p.10 n.5.) As those arguments have already been addressed by 
Mr. Russo, no further discussion as to those arguments is necessary herein. Rather, 
Mr. Russo simply refers this Court back to the arguments made in his prior briefs. 
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residence, it must have been within the "curtilage" and, therefore, it must have been on 
the "premises" so as to fall within the scope of the warrant. Finally, the State assumes 
that, so long as a person is found within a place for which a search warrant has issued, 
the warrant necessarily authorizes a search of that person, as well as the personal 
effects found on that person. 
Mr. Russo submits that the State is wrong at each step of its tortured analysis, 
and that its conclusion, therefore, is likewise incorrect. 
First, the search warrant in this case authorized a search of Mr. Russo's 
residence; it did not simply authorize a search of certain "premises," as the State would 
have this Court believe. While the warrant made mention of the term "premises," it very 
clearly and specifically defined those premises to be searched as Mr. Russo's 
residence. Specifically, the warrant stated, in relevant part, as follows: 
These items . . . are located in the following described premises and/or 
motor vehicle, to-wit: 
Residence: 818 W. 8th Street, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
The residence sits at the dead end of Northwest 8th Street in 
Meridian and faces West. The residence is a four-plex with 
a brown shingle roof. The front of the residence has brick on 
it. The sides of the house are a pale white wood. The 
residence has the silver metal numbers 818 affixed to a 
brown piece of wood on the front of the residence to the left 
of the door. The residence has a white door. There is a 
stairwell on the south and east side of the four-plex. The 
residence of 818 is located on the bottom floor of the four-
plex and is on the left side if you are facing the house from 
Northwest 8th Street. 
Motorcycle: a 1983 Black Harley Davidson Motorcycle. The 
license plate number is MRE345. The motorcycle is 
registered to Michael Russo. 
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YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED, at any time of the day, to make 
immediate search of the above-described premises [sic]5 for the property 
described above .... 
(R., p.134 (bold in original; italics added).) 
Just as it would with a statute or a contract, this Court should construe the search 
warrant in this case so as to give meaning to its plain language. See United States v. 
Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885, 912 (9th Cir. 2013) (interpreting a search warrant based on 
the plain meaning of the text contained therein); cf. Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners 
Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 528 (2012) ("If the language is plain and unambiguous, 
interpretation is a matter of law, and this Court will give the contract as a whole its plain 
meaning."); Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Gtr., 151 Idaho 889, 892-93 (2011) 
('The interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words of the statute; those 
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be 
construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, 
but simply follows the law as written."'). Here, the search warrant plainly authorized a 
search of Mr. Russo's residence and motorcycle only, as it specifically defined the 
"premises" as such. (See R., p.134.) The warrant did not authorize a search of the 
areas around the residence, people found near the residence, or things discovered in 
the vicinity of the residence. Indeed, if such searches were to be authorized, the 
5 Presumably, the issuing magistrate intended to command a search of "the above-
described premises and lor motor vehicle," not just the premises, given that the warrant 
had just indicated that the items sought were suspected to be in "the following described 
premises andlor motor vehicle." 
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warrant would have said SO.6 Because the warrant is clear on its face, this Court should 
adhere to its plain language. 
Second, to the extent that this Court is inclined to look beyond the plain language 
of the search warrant and attempt to divine its scope based on other considerations, it 
should not accept the State's invitation to adopt a bright-line rule that the term 
"premises" is always synonymous with "curtilage," such that any warrant containing the 
word "premises" necessarily authorizes a search of the place described, as well as 
certain surrounding areas. Rather, this Court should define the scope of a given 
warrant in light of the warrant as a whole. 
The State seeks to have this Court expand the scope of the search warrant in 
this case by focusing myopically on the term "premises." The State suggests that that 
term has a universally expansive meaning (the State equates it to the "curtilage"), such 
that any search warrant that includes the term "premises" necessarily authorizes not 
only a search of the residence on such property, but also a search of the entirety of the 
6 Notably, when officers discovered a separate structure housing a common laundry 
facility behind Mr. Russo's apartment building, they went back to the magistrate and 
obtained an amended search warrant authorizing searches of the phones already 
found, Mr. Russo's "residence," his motorcycle, and the following additional "premises": 
Premises: A detached carport that has attached storage rooms and a 
laundry room. This structure is separate from the main building. The 
numbers 818 appear on the doors of the storage rooms. The structure 
also has the number 8-1-8 on it and they are black and white in color. The 
laundry room is shared by other occupants and contains a washer and 
dryer. The structure is directly behind and to the east of the apartment. 
The structure is wood and is painted brown. The carport is open and has 
a metal roof. 
(R., p.156.) This amended warrant is remarkable for two reasons. First, it makes it 
exceedingly clear that it is not difficult to particularly describe in a search warrant the 
areas outside of a residence to be searched, if those areas are also to be searched 
pursuant to the warrant. Second, it makes it apparent that when the original warrant 
described the premises to be searched as Mr. Russo's "residence," it truly only meant 
the residence and not the areas and structures surrounding the residence. 
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curtilage, as well as anyone or anything found thereon. However, as one of the State's 
own authorities demonstrate, this one-size-fits-all approach to the term "premises" is 
misplaced. 
In State v. Sapp, 110 Idaho 153 (Ct. App. 1986), the search warrant at issue 
authorized a search of the "premises ... described as follows," then included a 
description of the property generally, as well as driving directions to the property (which 
included a reference to where the "residence" was on that property). See Sapp, 110 
Idaho at 154. The Court of Appeals held that the term "premises" "does not have one 
fixed and definite meaning, but rather must be interpreted in light of the context and 
circumstances in which it is used." Id. at 155. Thus, in light of the particular language 
used in the warrant in that case, the Court held that the "premises" included the 
"residence" and a greenhouse on the property, but not vehicles on the property. Id. at 
155-56.7 
7 Of the other cases relied upon by the State for the proposition that any search warrant 
containing the term "premises" should be interpreted as authorizing a search of the 
residence and the curtilage, the only one that appears to be of any aid to the State is 
Fine v. United States, 207 F.2d 324, 325 (6th Cir. 1953). The others are either wholly 
irrelevant or readily distinguishable. 
For example, in United States v. Gottschalk, 915 F.2d 1459 (10th Cir. 1990), the 
search warrant at issue "authorized the search of the entire premises" for 
methamphetamine and the implements and ingredients for making methamphetamine, 
as opposed to simply identifying a residence. Id. at 1459-60 (emphasis added). Given 
the broad parameters of the search area identified in the warrant, it seems infinitely 
logical that the court there held that the warrant authorized a search of any vehicles 
within the curtilage of the home. Id. at 1461. 
Likewise, in State v. Hagin, 691 S.E. 2d 429 (N.C. App. 2010), where the issue 
involved the scope of the defendant's consent (as opposed to the scope of a search 
warrant), the authorization was for "the personal or real property" at a given address. 
Id. at 562. Given this broad scope, again, it was logical for the court to hold that the 
search, which included an outbuilding, was within the scope of the consent given. Id. at 
432-33. 
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According to Sapp, and consistent with common sense, just because the search 
warrant in this case included the word "premises" at one point, does not mean that that 
warrant automatically authorized a search of the areas around Mr. Russo's home. The 
term "premises" must be viewed in context. And, as discussed above, the "premises" 
were specifically described as Mr. Russo's "residence." 
Further, as Mr. Russo has emphasized time and time again throughout this 
appeal, the United States Supreme Court has already made it abundantly clear that a 
warrant authorizing a search of a specific "residence" does not automatically authorize a 
search of someone found outside the residence-even if that person is just barely 
outside the residence. In Michigan v. Summers, where police had a warrant to search 
the defendant's house, the defendant was detained while descending the steps of his 
State v. Webb, 130 Idaho 462 (1997), is not relevant to the present case. The 
Webb Court simply acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court "has extended 
the Fourth Amendment's protection of a home against unreasonable searches and 
seizures to the curtilage" (as distinguished from the home's "open fields"), and upheld 
the trial court's determination that, under the facts of that case, a barn was not within 
the home's curtilage. That is not disputed, and it has nothing to do with the scope of the 
warrant in this case. 
Nor is State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 296 (Ct. App. 2002), relevant to this case. 
Pierce involved a relatively straightforward application of Michigan v. Summers, 452 
U.S. 692 (1981), and held simply that, while executing a search warrant, officers were 
free to temporarily detain a previously-unknown individual encountered in the driveway, 
approximately 15-20 feet from the home. See Pierce, 137 Idaho at 299-301. The Pierce 
Court did not address the question of whether that individual could be searched based 
on the warrant. See id. at 297, 298 n.1. Further, although the State would have this 
Court believe that Pierce provided a general definition of "premises" which will always 
include the driveway of the home searched, the reality is that Pierce is no more helpful 
to the State on this point than are Gottschalk, Hagin, and Sapp. In Pierce, the search 
warrant specifically identified the places to be searched as the home, a barn, a stable, 
and certain vehicles located on the subject property-in other words, the search warrant 
clearly authorized a search of the entire property, not just the residence. Pierce, 137 
Idaho 297. In this context, it made sense for the Court of Appeals to use the term 
"premises" to describe the property generally. 
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front porch,8 and the State of Michigan argued that the warrant authorizing the search of 
the "premises" "implicitly included the authority to search persons on those premises," 
the Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, rejected the State's argument because the defendant 
was "outside the premises described in the warrant." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 
692, 694 (1981). Likewise, in this case, Mr. Russo was undoubtedly outside his 
residence and, therefore, outside the premises described in the search warrant. 
Third, even if the search warrant in this case did authorize a search of the 
entirety of the "curtilage," the simple fact is that Mr. Russo was not within the curtilage of 
his home when he was detained and he and his phone were searched. Regarding the 
curtilage, the United States Supreme Court has explained as follows: 
At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate 
activity associated with the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of 
life," Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 ... (1886), and therefore 
has been considered part of home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. 
Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage; 
and they have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by reference 
to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect 
that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private. 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). The Court has also provided a four-
factored test for determining whether a given area is part of a home's curtilage: 
[C]urtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four 
factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, 
whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, 
the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the 
resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. 
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,300 (1987). 
8 There can be little doubt that the front porch of a single-family residence will generally 
be considered part of the curtilage. See Florida v. Jardines, _ U.S. _, _, 133 S. Ct. 
1409,1415 (2013) 
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In light of the definition of "curtilage," which focuses on the intimate activities of a 
family's private life, as well as the Dunn factors, which give meaningful effect to this 
definition, it should not be surprising that many courts have held that apartment 
buildings-where residents have little privacy outside their own units-do not have 
expansive curtilages. See, e.g., Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 & n.19 
(10th Gir. 2007) (applying the Dunn factors and holding that the front yard adjacent to a 
duplex, although close to the duplex, was not part of the curtilage; observing that, 
"Absent contrary facts and findings, the correct presumption would be that an 
unenclosed yard, used for no particular purpose (but shared with other tenants), 
adjacent to the street, and in no way shielded from observation or trespass is not 
curtilage"); United States v. Soliz, 129 F.3d 499 (9th Gir. 1997) (affirming trial court's 
determination that a fenced-in gravel parking area serving a small apartment complex, 
was not within the curtilage and noting that, "[w]e doubt whether, in the absence of 
evidence of intimate activities, a shared common area in a multi-unit dwelling compound 
is sufficiently privacy oriented to constitute curtilage"), overruled on other grounds by 
United States v. Johnson, 265 F.3d 895 (9th Gir. 2001 )9; United States v. Brooks, 645 
F.3d 971, 975-76 (8th Gir. 2011) (holding that the backyard of an apartment building, 
and the stairs leading to basement of that apartment building, were not within the 
curtilage, because they were common areas for tenants, visible to the public, and were 
not posted with "no trespassing" signs); United States v. Sewell, 942 F.2d 1209, 1212 
(ih Gir. 1991) (holding that a hallway outside the defendant's apartment was not part of 
9 The Soliz Gourt had had treated the curtilage determination as a question of fact and, 
therefore, applied a "clear error" standard of review. See Soliz, 129 F.3d at 502. 
Johnson made it clear that the curtilage determination involves a conclusion of law and, 
therefore, is reviewed de novo. Johnson, 265 F.3d at 913-15. 
13 
the curtilage, as it was open to the public); Mack v. City of Abilene, 461 F.3d 547, 554 
(5th Cir. 2006) (applying the Dunn factors and holding that, although the record did not 
reveal how far the defendant's vehicle was from his apartment, because it was parked 
in the open, in a parking lot used jointly by all residents, it was not within the curtilage); 
United States V. Pyne, 175 Fed. Appx. 639, 640-41 (4th Cir. 2006) (applying the Dunn 
factors and holding that a parking garage in a multi-level apartment building was not 
within the curtilage); United States V. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1254-57 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(reversing a trial court's determination that a backyard was part of a certain apartment's 
curtilage, even though tenants of other apartments were without specific authority to use 
that backyard, in large part, because the landlord still had use of the backyard and 
maintained the right to grant others access to backyard); United States V. Miguel, 340 
F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1965) (holding that lobby of multi-tenanted apartment house was 
not within the curtilage of any of the individual units); United States V. Cruz Pagan, 537 
F.2d 554, 557-58 (1 st Cir. 1976) (holding that a condominium resident can have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in an underground parking area, in part, because it is 
not within the curtilage because "[i]n a modern urban multifamily apartment house, the 
area within the 'curtilage' is necessarily much more limited than in the case of a rural 
dwelling subject to one owner's control," and "[i]n such an apartment house, a tenant's 
'dwelling' cannot reasonably be said to extend beyond his own apartment and perhaps 
any separate areas subject to his exclusive control") (quoting Commonwealth V. 
Thomas, 267 N.E.2d 489, 491 (Mass. 1971)); People V. Becker, 533 P.2d 494, 496 
(Colo. 1975) (en banc) (holding that a common area outside an apartment window is not 
within the curtilage); State V. Nguyen, _ N.W.2d _, 2013 WL 6835011, *4 (N.D. Dec. 
14 
26, 2013) (applying the Dunn factors and holding that, "unlike the area immediately 
surrounding a home, a party does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
common hallways and shared spaces of an apartment building," and, therefore, those 
areas are not within the curtilage).10 See a/so Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 103-06 
(1988) (Breyer, J., concurring) (agreeing with the state court that a grassy common 
area, used by apartment building residents for walking, playing, and storing bicycles, 
which was immediately outside a ground-level window of the subject apartment, was not 
within the curtilage); California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 319 (1987) (White, J., 
dissenting from dismissal of writ of certioran) (agreeing with state court that a communal 
trash bin in the basement of an apartment building is not within the curtilage). 
Applying the Dunn factors in this case, there can little doubt that the apartment 
building's mailboxes were not within Mr. Russo's curtilage. The suppression hearing 
evidence is not entirely clear as to how far Mr. Russo had to walk from his front door to 
get to the apartment building's mailbox area, but it is clear that the mailboxes were 
outside, such that Mr. Russo had to exit his residence and go outside to reach that area. 
(See R., pp.139, 142.) Apparently, the mailboxes were not contained within any sort of 
enclosure surrounding only Mr. Russo's apartment (as they apparently served all the 
residents of his four-plex). (See R., p.139 (referencing Mr. Russo going to the 
"mailboxes").) Certainly, the mailbox area is not a private place where the "intimate 
activity" of Mr. Russo's home would occur, as it was an area in plain view of curious 
10 As the Nguyen Court made clear, the majority rule is that there is no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in even the secured common areas of apartment buildings 
because, although not generally open to the public, they are shared with other tenants 
and their guests. See Nguyen, 2013 WL 6835011 at *2-3. And, of course, that is to say 
nothing of the common areas open to the public at large. 
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eyes (see R, p.142 (making it clear that Mr. Russo was observed exiting his residence 
and heading to the mailbox area while the observing officers were sitting in police cars 
on the street in front of the apartment building)), and it was in a common area open not 
only to the other residents of Mr. Russo's building, but also the mail carrier and, 
presumably the public at large (see R, p.139 (referencing the "mailboxes," thereby 
indicating a common mail area outside the building). Finally, it appears there were no 
steps taken to shield the mailbox area from public view. Indeed, as noted, it was 
outside the front of the building where it was readily observable by the public. 
(R, pp.139, 142.)11 
Fourth, even if the warrant authorized a search of the entire curtilage, and the 
mailbox area where Mr. Russo was detained was deemed to be within that curtilage, the 
mere fact that Mr. Russo was found in the place for which a search warrant exists does 
not mean that his person was subject to search as well. While the Court of Appeals in 
this case had little trouble concluding that a search warrant for a residence, even if it 
does not name the resident, authorizes a search of the resident if he is found therein 
(see Opinion, p.6 n.2), the fact is that this is not such a simple question. If it were, it 
would not have been reserved for another day by the Supreme Court when it decided 
Summers. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 695 (1981) ("If that detention was 
permissible, there is no need to reach the question whether a search warrant for 
11 Although it appears not to have been made part of the record at the suppression 
heating, Exhibit 25 is a photograph of Mr. Russo's building (see Tr., p.351, Ls.3-6), and 
it shows the precise orientation of the mailbox area vis-a-vis the building. (See Ex. 25.) 
That photograph shows that the mailboxes are grouped together-across the front lawn 
from the building, and fronting the public street. (See Ex. 25.) Although the photograph 
is not entirely clear as to whether there is a sidewalk in front of the mailboxes, it appears 
that in order for a resident to check his/her mail, that resident would have to be standing 
either on the sidewalk (if any exists) or in the street. (See Ex. 25.) 
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premises includes the right to search persons found there, because when the police 
searched respondent, they had probable cause to arrest him and had done so."). 
Further, in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), which preceded Summers by a couple 
of years, the Supreme Court had already made it clear that a warrant authorizing the 
search of a particular place does not automatically authorize the search of everyone 
found therein. Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91-92. While the holding Ybarra could arguably be 
limited to situations in which the individual at issue has no specific connection to the 
place searched, such that there is no particularized suspicion as to that person, see id. 
at 90-92 (discussing the absence of a particularized suspicion regarding the defendant); 
Summers, 452 U.S. at 695 n.4 (discussing Ybarra and characterizing part of the holding 
as follows: "the Court concluded that the search of Ybarra was invalid because the 
police had no reason to believe he had any special connection with the premises"), and 
certainly some courts have adopted such an interpretation of Ybarra (see Opinion, p.10 
(Gratton, J., concurring) (citing a Louisiana case for the proposition that the "search of 
the resident is reasonably and necessarily within the scope of the warrant)), Ybarra 
need not necessarily be given such a narrow reading. It could just as easily be read to 
stand for the proposition that warrants authorizing the searches of places do not 
impliedly authorize the searches of people. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 682 F.2d 
876, 879-81 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that a warrant authorizing a search of a man's 
residence, but not his person, issued based on probable cause that the man had 
engaged in book-making, did not authorize the search of the person of the man, even 
though the man was inside the residence when warrant was executed, and it was 
reasonable to believe that evidence of book-making would be located on his person); 
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Munz v. Ryan, 752 F. Supp. 1537, 1541-42 (D. Kan. 1990) (holding that a warrant 
authorizing a search of a woman's residence, but not her person, issued based on 
probable cause that the woman had stolen certain marked bills, did not authorize the 
search of the person of the woman, even though the woman was inside the residence 
when the warrant was executed, and it was reasonable to believe the sought-after bills 
would be located on her person). Indeed, given the particularity requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment, and the additional intrusion of having one's person searched, it 
makes little sense to read implied targets into search warrants. 
In light of all of the foregoing, Mr. Russo respectfully requests that this Court 
reject the State's arguments on review, read the search warrant in accordance with its 
plain language, and hold that where a warrant particularly describes the place to be 
searched as one specific place, it does not mean that searches are authorized for 
wherever the evidence sought happens to have been found. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, and in his three prior briefs in this appeal, 
Mr. Russo respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's orders 
denying suppression of the cell phone video and admitting evidence of his sexual 
fantasies and pornography, that it vacate his convictions and sentences, and that it 
remand his case for a new trial. 
DATED this ih day of January, 2014. 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
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